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The Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB 
  Jeffrey S. Lubbers* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
It is striking to note that there seems to be more Labor Law notice-
and-comment rulemaking in the People’s Republic of China than there is in 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).   
In May 2008, the Legislative Affairs Office of China’s State Council 
released a draft of Regulations on the Implementation of Labor Contract 
Law and began seeking public comments.1  The Regulations consist of    
forty-five articles, mainly including provisions on open-term labor con-
tracts, economic compensation, outsourced labor, etc.2  I later learned that 
82,000 “opinions” from the public were received.3 
                                                                                                                           
 * Jeffrey S. Lubbers is a Professor of Practice in Administrative Law at American University’s 
Washington College of Law.  This article was prepared for the FIU Law Review Symposium, Whither 
the Board? The National Labor Relations Board at 75, March 26, 2010. 
 1 See “Labor Contract Law Implementation Regulations Opened for Public Comment,”  XINHUA  
NEWS  (May 9, 2008), available at http://www.csrlaws.com/reports-71.html (announcing that release).  
The Labor Law Contract itself was adopted at the 28th Session of the Standing Committee of the 10th 
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on June 29, 2007 and entered into force 
as of January 1, 2008. See Li & Fund Research Centre, China’s Newly Adopted Labor Contract Law, 
China  Distribution  and  Trading, at  3 (July 2007),  available at http://www.idsgroup.com/profile/pdf/ 
distributing/issue42.pdf (reporting that 190,000 responses were received in a month).  I should hasten to 
add that, while China is making significant progress in obtaining public comment on proposals, it lacks 
an administrative procedure act that requires agencies to respond to such comments or allows adversely 
affected persons to seek judicial review of these sorts of “normative acts.” See Peter Howard Corne, 
Creation and Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 387 (2002) (describing the con-
sultation process but opining that “the key problem remains that the drafters, despite extensive solicita-
tion for public comment and consultation, may decide not to take the comments on board”); John 
Ohnesorge, Chinese Administrative Law in the Northeast Asian Mirror, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 148 (2006) (describing the government’s resistance to judicial review).  
 2 See generally Gregory Sy, Implementation Regulations For the Labor Contract Law of the 
People’s Republic of China – A Summary, http://ezinearticles.com/?Implementation-Regulations-For-
the-Labor-Contract-Law-of-the-Peoples-Republic-of-China-A-Summary&id=1545454 (summarizing 
the final regulations). 
 3 See Procedures Guidelines for Public Opinion Solicitation in Administrative Legislation 
through Mass Media like Internet and Newspapers, at 3 (unsigned, undated briefing paper received from 
Chinese government for conference in Beijing, March 4-5, 2010, on file with author).  
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In contrast, although the NLRB has clear statutory authority to use 
rulemaking,4 its last major successful substantive rulemaking was         
completed in 1989, when the Board issued a rule specifying the collective 
bargaining units in acute-care health care facilities5 – a rule that was upheld 
by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. American Hospital Ass’n.6  Since then the 
Board has proposed but withdrawn two other substantive rules.  One, a rule 
to implement the Supreme Court’s decision in Communications Workers v. 
Beck,7 was proposed in September 19928 and withdrawn in 1996.9  The oth-
er, concerning the appropriateness of single location bargaining units in 
certain industries, was floated in an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
in 1994,10 proposed in 1995,11 and withdrawn in 1998.12  Other than those 
two failed attempts, in the past 20 years, the Board has issued a smattering 
of procedural, privacy, and housekeeping rules – mostly as final rules – and 
has used the notice-and-comment process only 17 times.13   
This seems curious since the Board clearly has broad discretion to 
make policy either by rulemaking or adjudication.  Over the years, the    
Supreme Court and lower courts have basically upheld the legality of     
policymaking by adjudication (with some limits on application of newly 
                                                                                                                           
 4 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2006) (“The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, 
and rescind, in the manner prescribed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, such rules and regulations 
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.”). 
 5 See Collective Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336 (Apr. 21, 
1989) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103).   
 6 NLRB v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n., 499 U.S. 606 (1991); see also Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s 
First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274 (1991) (providing a comprehensive 
analysis of the rule making challenged in NLRB v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n and the ensuing litigation). 
 7 Commc’n Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). 
 8 See Union Dues Regulations 57 Fed. Reg. 43,635 (proposed Sept. 22, 1992) (to be codified at 
29 C.F.R. pt. 103) (following 57 Fed. Reg. 7897 (proposed Mar. 5, 1992) (an earlier advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking)). 
 9 See Rules and Procedures for the Implementation of Commc’n Workers v. Beck,  61 Fed. Reg. 
11,167 (proposed Mar. 19, 1996) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 102); see also, Scott A. Zebrak, Com-
ment, The Future of NLRB Rulemaking: Analyzing the Mixed Signals Sent by the Implementation of the 
Health Care Bargaining Unit Rule and by the Proposed Beck Union Dues Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 
AM. U. 125, 147-58 (1994) (analyzing the Board’s rulemaking response to Beck prior to its subsequent 
withdrawal of the rule). 
 10 See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 
59 Fed. Reg. 28,501 (proposed June 2, 1994) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103).  
 11 See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 
60 Fed. Reg. 50,146 (proposed Sept. 28, 1995) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103).  
 12 See Rules Regarding Standardized Remedial Provisions in Board Unfair Labor Practice Deci-
sions and the Appropriateness of Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 8890 (proposed Feb. 23, 1998) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103).  
 13 In the twenty years from 1990 to the present, a search of Westlaw by the author on May 10, 
2010 [NLRB & “proposed rule” & da(aft 1989)] revealed that the Board has only issued about 30 rule-
making documents, which were most of the procedural or housekeeping rules that were issued as final 
rules without notice and comment. 
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announced policies to parties before the Board who might have relied on 
the law as it was).14  And its authority to issue rules was upheld by a unani-
mous Supreme Court (affirming the Seventh Circuit’s decision authored by 
Judge Posner).15 
One would think that the Board would have taken its hard-earned vic-
tory in the Supreme Court and built on it.  Indeed, Professor Mark 
Grunewald, in his study prepared for the Administrative Conference of the 
United States in the aftermath of the Board’s victory in the Supreme Court, 
wrote that “[t]he Board’s institutional resolve against substantive          
rulemaking appeared to have collapsed, and it was possible to imagine 
wide-ranging and vigorous use of this previously dormant policymaking 
device in the labor relations area.”16 
However, this vision has not materialized.  Instead the Board main-
tained its resistance to rulemaking, despite its apparent success in the health 
care bargaining unit rule.  Other than that rule, codified at 29 C.F.R. § 
103.30, the Board’s CFR chapter only contains three other substantive rules 
(listed in Part 103 under the heading, “Other Rules”).  These cover jurisdic-
tional standards for colleges and universities,17 and two relatively insignifi-
cant workplaces – symphony orchestras,18 and horse/dog racing.19 
 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (holding that normally “the 
choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance in the Board’s discretion); NLRB v. 
St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the Board could announce a prospective 
policy in an adjudication, but had to allow parties in subsequent enforcement actions to challenge appli-
cation of the policy to them).  
 15 N.L.R.B. v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n., 499 U.S. 606 (1991), aff’g 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990).  
 16 Grunewald, supra note 6, at 276.  
 17 Colleges and Universities, 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (2009).  According to the final rule preamble, the 
proposed rule received 33 comments. Colleges and Universities, 35 Fed. Reg. 18,370 (Dec. 19, 1970).  
 18 Symphony Orchestras, 29 C.F.R. § 103.2 (2009).  According to the final rule preamble, the 
proposed rule received 26 comments.  Jurisdictional Standards Applicable to Symphony Orchestras, 38 
Fed. Reg. 6176 (Mar. 7, 1973).  
 19 Horseracing and Dogracing Industries, 29 C.F.R. § 103.3 (2009).  This rule simply announced 
that the Board would not assert jurisdiction under in any proceeding under sections 8-10 of the NLRA 
involving these industries.  The final rule preamble, did not disclose how many comments were received 
on the proposal. See Horseracing and Dogracing Industries, 38 Fed. Reg. 9507 (Apr. 17, 1973). Two 
other rules in the part are really procedural rules:  one on posting of election notices (29 C.F.R. § 
103.30), and another on notices concerning offers of reinstatement to military employees (29 C.F.R. § 
103.100).  There are three other parts in the NLRB’s CFR chapter:  “Administrative regulations,” (29 
C.F.R. pt. 100), “Statement of procedures” (pt. 101), and “Rules and regulations, Series 8” (pt. 103).  All 
of these rules concern rules of practice before the Board and other procedural and housekeeping 
measures. 
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II. THE BOARD’S CONSISTENT HISTORY OF SHRUGGING OFF CRITICISM 
BY COMMENTATORS 
This is not a new issue for the Board.  It has always made policy     
primarily through case-by-case adjudication.  Professor Grunewald’s article 
lists nine articles criticizing the Board for not making greater use of rule-
making,20 starting with Cornelius Peck’s 1961 article, “The Atrophied 
Rulemaking Powers of the National Labor Relations Board”21 and only one 
that defends the Board’s practice.22  Indeed, in the face of this criticism by 
commentators it has justified this posture in legal briefs.23   
Nor is the NLRB alone in being criticized for over-reliance on policy-
making through adjudication.  As one commentator has concluded:  
The use of administrative adjudication as a significant means of   
agency lawmaking has been the subject of sustained academic         
critique.  In a series of articles spanning more than a half century, aca-
demic commentators have argued that agency lawmaking through    
adjudication suffers from a number of significant drawbacks –         
including decreased public participation, a lack of prospectivity, lesser 
transparency or predictability for regulated entities, and a tendency to 
arise in fact-bound circumstances – which make it inferior to legisla-
tive lawmaking by administrative agencies.24 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Grunewald, supra note 6, at 274-75, n.3 (citing Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB’s Adjudica-
tion-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Samuel 
Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163 
(1985); Kenneth Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Adju-
dication, 21 UCLA L. REV. 63 (1973); Charles J. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House—Can an Old 
Board Learn New Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1987); Cornelius J. Peck, A Critique of the National 
Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. 
PA. L. REV. 254 (1968); Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rulemaking Powers of the National Labor 
Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication 
in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965); Carl S. Silverman, The Case 
for the National Labor Relations Board’s Use of Rulemaking in Asserting Jurisdiction, 25 LAB. L.J. 607 
(1974); and Berton B. Subrin, Conserving Energy at the Labor Board:  The Case for Making Rules on 
Collective Bargaining Units, 32 LAB. L.J. 105 (1981). 
 21 Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rulemaking Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 
70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961). 
 22 Robert L. Willmore, Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness, 89 
YALE L.J. 982 (1980). 
 23 See Zebrak, supra note 9, at 129 (describing the NLRB’s brief in the Supreme Court case of 
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969)). 
 24 Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 649 
(2008).  She notes the very early article by Milton Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175, 
259-61 (1936) suggested that it would be preferable for the Federal Trade Commission to make law 
through legislative lawmaking rather than through adjudication.  Also on this subject she cites William 
T. Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the Rulemaking Versus Adjudication Problem in Agency Law-
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In 1986 then-ACUS General Counsel Richard K. Berg provided a 
classic listing of the respective advantages between adjudication and rule-
making for policy making purposes.25  He began by saying that neither 
mode “is an inherently superior mode of decisionmaking for all occa-
sions.”26  With respect to adjudication, he said that it is the “better suited for 
intensive exploration of factual disputes and perhaps for resolving narrow 
policy issues involving limited numbers of contestants.”27  He pointed out 
that, with respect to formal adjudication at least, “the party most immedi-
ately affected has substantially greater procedural rights than he would have 
in rulemaking.”28  He also said that adjudication “lends itself to an incre-
mental kind of policymaking, in which conclusions formed in one case are 
tested and applied or perhaps modified in another case.”29 
Berg then went on to describe the advantages of rulemaking “where 
the agency is faced with an issue of potentially broad application or effect.”  
His catalogue of “frequently cited” reasons include: 
1. “Rulemaking with its wider notice and broader opportunities for 
participation is fairer to the class of persons who would be affected by 
a new ‘rule’ than if the rule were formulated in an adjudication.  Such 
broader participation also makes rulemaking more efficient as a way 
for the agency to gather information.” 
2. Because rulemaking is normally prospective it is superior as a 
means of making new policy. 
3. A generally applicable rule can provide “greater clarity to those    
affected as well as greater uniformity in enforcement.” 
                                                                                                                           
making, 1980 DUKE L.J. 103, 103 (1980) as “noting that the ‘consensus’ is that agency lawmaking via 
legislation is superior to adjudication.”  Other articles she cites (not cited by Professor Grunewald) 
criticizing agencies for not using more rulemaking include: Carl McFarland, Landis’ Report: The Voice 
of One Crying in the Wilderness, 47 VA. L. REV. 373, 433-38 (1961) and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two 
Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial 
Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 308-09 (1988).  Other articles with a more 
ambivalent or more balanced view identified by Ms. Eyer include: E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing 
Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1491-92 (1992), Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudica-
tion: A Psychological Perspective, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 529, 550-53 (2005); and Glen O. Robinson, 
The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative 
Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 514-28 (1970).  
 25 Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking and 
Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 163-64 (1986) (providing a list of advantages for agencies in 
using of rulemaking instead of adjudication).   
 26 Id. at 162. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
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4. Rulemaking’s procedures (at least as provided for in Section 553 of 
the APA) provide more flexibility than the formal adjudication proce-
dures mandated by Sections 554, 556, and 557.  Specifically the agen-
cy has more control over presentation of information and may resort 
to its staff expertise without worrying about the separation of func-
tions requirements in Section 554. 
5.  Agencies can better control the scope and pace of rulemaking and 
thereby maintain better control over its agenda.   
6.  A final rule issued after notice-and-comment rulemaking can 
“thereafter be applied without re-examination to eliminate case-by-
case adjudications.” 
This last point is important in two ways.  A rule properly issued in a 
rulemaking proceeding allows agencies to limit or eliminate issues that 
might otherwise require a hearing in an individual case.30  And it also pro-
duces a binding precedent in future cases, unlike a rule announced in an 
adjudication which can be challenged in future enforcement actions by dif-
ferent parties.31  On the other hand, the agency is also bound and cannot 
change a “rulemaking rule” in a future adjudication; it must change it in 
another rulemaking proceeding.32  This aspect might have particular sali-
ence at the NLRB where shifting majorities often seek to change past adju-
dicative precedents.33  It may appeal to a Board that wishes to enshrine its 
new policy in a way that is more difficult to change.  On the other hand, the 
Board has defended its reluctance to use rulemaking because the “cumber-
some process of amending formal rules would impede the law’s ability to 
respond quickly and accurately to changing industrial practices.”34 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983); F.P.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); 
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 359 F.2d 
624, 633 (1966) (en banc).  
 31 Compare N.L.R.B. v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1979) (rule announced in an 
adjudication is precedential but may be challenged in next case), with Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. 
F.T.C., 482 F.2d 672, 690 (D.C. Cir 1973) (noting that one benefit of making policy via rulemaking was 
that main issue in future enforcement actions would simply be whether defendant had violated the rule). 
 32 See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 3090 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 777 F.2d 751, 
759 (D.C. Cir.1985) (holding that an agency “seeking to repeal or modify a legislative rule promulgated 
by means of notice and comment rulemaking is obligated to undertake similar procedures to accomplish 
such modification or repeal. . . .  [U]ntil it amends or repeals a valid legislative rule or regulation, an 
agency is bound by such a rule or regulation.”). 
 33 See, e.g., Int’l Union v N.L.R.B., 802 F2d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding while Board is not 
bound by stare decisis, it may “jettison its precedents only if it has ‘adequately explicated the basis of its 
new interpretation’” (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 267, (1975)).  
 34 See Zebrak, supra note 9 at 129. 
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Since Berg compiled his list, it is possible that the calculus has 
changed as rulemaking itself has become more “ossified.”35  The multiplici-
ty of statutorily and presidentially required analytical and procedural addi-
tions to rulemaking may have led agencies to move away from rulemaking 
to adjudication.36  However, I know of no empirical or even anecdotal evi-
dence to prove that this has happened.  Moreover, policymaking by adjudi-
cation may also have become more problematic due to agency problems 
with the system of administrative law judges (ALJs) that must normally be 
used in formal adjudication.  Agencies have “voted with their feet” by 
choosing to employ more informal adjudicative procedures including “non-
ALJ adjudicators” through various means.37  More likely, the locus of agen-
cy policymaking has shifted away from notice-and-comment rulemaking to 
informal “guidance,” that may fall within an exemption from the notice-
and-comment procedures of the APA, but only if it is not binding or treated 
as binding on the public.38   
It would be hard for this article to contribute anything new to the     
excellent scholarship concerning the Board’s past stance on the choice of 
rulemaking versus adjudication, or even on the general issues confronting 
agencies in this regard.  Rather, as part of this symposium, I will assume 
that there is renewed interest in rulemaking at the Board and review the 
situation as it presents itself today. 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking Process – For Better or 
Worse, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 469 (2008) (describing the reduction in proposed and final rules since 
1980 and attributing it to the many additional requirements applicable to rulemaking found in other 
statutes and executive orders).  For the use of the term “ossify,” see, for example, Thomas O. McGarity, 
Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995).   
 36 One of the first to raise this possibility was then-Professor Antonin Scalia in 1981. See, Berg, 
supra note 25, at 149 (citing Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, 
REGULATION, July/Aug. 1981, at 25) (noting Scalia’s “prophe[cy]” that agencies might “turn to adjudi-
cation” to avoid the “increasing procedural burdens on rulemaking”)). 
 37 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. 
L.J. AM. U. 65 (1996) (detailing the paucity of ALJs at many agencies). 
 38 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Our cases . . . make clear that 
an agency pronouncement will be considered binding as a practical matter if it either appears on its face 
to be binding . . . or is applied by the agency in a way that indicates it is binding.”). For more on legal 
limits on agency use of policy statements, see JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY 
RULEMAKING 94-105 (4th ed. 2006).   
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  III.  NLRB’S MOST RECENT EXPERIENCES WITH RULEMAKING 
A.  Health Care Bargaining Unit Rulemaking Timeline 
The Board’s successful health care rule was proposed on July 2, 
1987,39 and public hearings were held in Washington, Chicago and San 
Francisco on August 17-18, August 31-September 1, and September 14-16, 
1987.  During the hearings 144 witnesses testified and the Board received 
315 written comments.40  It was re-proposed on September 1, 1988.41  The 
final rule was issued on April 21, 1989.42  The district court enjoined the 
rule on July 25, 1989,43 the court of appeals reversed on April 11, 1990,44 
and the Supreme Court affirmed on April 23, 1991.45  Thus, the rulemaking 
itself took 1¾ years and the litigation took another two years.  But this 
timeline obviously should not be the norm.  The Board’s voluntary use of 
three sets of public hearings may have made sense due to the novelty and 
complexity of this rulemaking, but it clearly added a lot of time to the pro-
cess and would normally not be necessary. 
As Professor Grunewald noted: 
[A] portion of the two years was consumed with a procedure not re-
quired for notice and comment rulemaking – multi-location hearings 
with an opportunity for a form of cross-examination. . . . Under the 
circumstances of this rulemaking, particularly its novelty for the 
Board, the hearings were probably a desirable choice.  Certainly as a 
legal matter, however, and perhaps as a practical matter, the hearings 
were procedural overkill and the burdens created by the number and 
structure of the hearings would have to be considered as part of the 
overall cost-benefit evaluation of the rulemaking.46 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Collective Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (proposed July 2, 
1987) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103).  
 40 Grunewald, supra note 6, at 300-01. 
 41 Collective Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900 (proposed Sept. 
1, 1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103).  
 42 See Collective Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336 (Apr. 21, 
1989) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103).   
 43 Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2751 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 1989).  
 44 Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990).  
 45 Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 499 U.S. 606 (1991).  
 46 Grunewald, supra note 6, at 319-20.  The Administrative Conference echoed this view:   
The Board should publish rulemaking procedures that conform to the informal rulemaking proce-
dures of the Administrative Procedure Act. These procedures should not require oral hearings or 
other procedures in addition to notice and the opportunity for comment, as a general matter, alt-
hough such additional procedures may be useful for particular rulemakings. 
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Nor would a second round of notice and comments normally be re-
quired.  And Supreme Court review obviously will be a rare occurrence.  
On the other hand, the number of written comments was quite low by    
today’s standards, and, unless a judicial review provision is added to the 
NLRA as recommended below, two rounds of judicial review would likely 
be the norm in any controversial Board rulemaking. 
B.  Beck Rulemaking Timeline 
The Beck case was decided June 29, 1988.  The Board issued an      
advance notice of proposed rulemaking on March 5, 1992, and a notice of 
proposed rulemaking in September 22, 1992.  It was withdrawn on March 
19, 1996.47  In its explanation for the withdrawal, the Board said that it had 
addressed many of the issues raised by the notice of proposed rulemaking in 
several recent adjudications, and that other cases on its docket “will afford 
the Board the opportunity to address many, if not all, of the remaining    
issues that are addressed in the notice of proposed rulemaking.  It is the 
Board’s belief that those issues may now be more expeditiously resolved in 
those cases than in the rulemaking proceeding.”48 
C.  Single Location Bargaining Unit Rulemaking Timeline  
The proposal concerning the appropriateness of single location bar-
gaining units in certain industries was floated in an advance notice of pro-
posed rulemaking on June 2, 1994, proposed on September 28, 1995, and 
withdrawn on February 23, 1998.49  In its terse explanation the Board, with 
one member dissenting, stated that it took this action because “no action has 
                                                                                                                           
Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure: 
Facilitating the Use of Rulemaking by the National Labor Relations Board (Recommendation 91-5), 56 
Fed. Reg. 33,841, 33,852, ¶ 2(a) (July 24, 1991) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.91-5), available at 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305915.html.  
 47 See Commc’n Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Union Dues Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 
43,635 (proposed Sept. 22, 1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103) (following 57 Fed. Reg. 7897 
(proposed Mar. 5, 1992) (an earlier advance notice of proposed rulemaking)); Rules and Procedures for 
the Implementation of Commc’n Workers v. Beck, 61 Fed. Reg. 11,167 (proposed Mar. 19, 1996) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 102); see also, Scott A. Zebrak, Comment, The Future of NLRB Rulemaking: 
Analyzing the Mixed Signals Sent by the Implementation of the Health Care Bargaining Unit Rule and 
by the Proposed Beck Union Dues Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 125, 147-58 (1994) (analyzing the 
Board’s rulemaking response to Beck prior to its subsequent withdrawal of the rule).  
 48 Rules and Procedures for the Implementation of Commc’n Workers v. Beck, 61 Fed. Reg. 
11,167 (proposed Mar. 19, 1996) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 102).  
 49 See Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 
59 Fed. Reg. 28,501 (proposed June 2, 1994) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103); Appropriateness of 
Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,146 (proposed 
Sept. 28, 1995) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103); 63 Fed. Reg. 8890 (proposed Feb. 23, 1998) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103).  
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been taken by the Board on [the] rulemaking proceeding for several years 
and [because of] the Board’s determination to focus its time and resources 
on reducing the backlog of adjudicated cases pending before the Board.”50  
It also dropped a footnote citing a congressional rider attached to each of 
the NLRB’s 1996, 1997, and 1998 appropriations bills that prohibited the 
agency from expending any funds to promulgate a final rule in that rule-
making proceeding.51 
  IV.  POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO BOARD RULEMAKING TODAY  
A.  “Ossification” Concerns Should be Somewhat Less for the Board  
The ossification concerns mentioned above that currently affect all 
agency rulemaking may be less pronounced for an independent agency like 
the Board.  Several important statutes and almost all of the analytical and 
procedural requirements found in Executive Orders and other presidential 
directives are inapplicable to Board rulemaking.  The primary statutes that 
apply, other than the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, are the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), and the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (along with its follow-up legislation the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act).  The National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) also applies, but it is difficult to imagine how 
a Board rule would be a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment.”52   
1.  Paperwork Reduction Act 
The NLRB rarely has a problem with the PRA.  In its occasional pro-
cedural rulemakings it has disclaimed any impositions of reporting or 
recordkeeping requirements under the PRA.  On occasion it has appropri-
ately sought Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval of a free-
standing form or other information collection request.53  While it is true that 
a substantive rulemaking may contain a reporting requirement or other   
information collection request, and that would bring the NLRB into the 
orbit of OMB review, the Board, like all independent regulatory agencies 
has the right under the Act to override a denial of approval by a majority 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Withdrawal of Proposed Rulemakings, 63 Fed. Reg. 8890, 8891 (Feb. 23, 1998). 
 51 Id. at n.2.  
 52 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).   
 53 See, e.g., Notice of Final Designation Procedures for Grantees, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,643, 75,652 
(Dec. 31, 2003) (form for supplemental statement for application for professional position in the Office 
of the General Counsel).  
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vote of its members.54  Thus, the PRA should not pose much of an obstacle 
to NLRB rulemaking. 
2.  Regulatory Flexibility Act 
The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to consider the       
impact of proposed rules on “small entities” – including “small businesses,” 
“small (not-for-profit) organizations,” and “small governmental jurisdic-
tions.”55  The Act does not, however, mandate any particular outcome in 
rulemaking.  It only requires consideration of alternatives that are less bur-
densome to small entities and an agency explanation of why alternatives 
were rejected.56 
In practice, the way this would work is that unless the Board certifies 
to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration, 
and publishes such certification in the Federal Register, that the rule will 
not have a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities,”57 the agency must prepare an “initial regulatory flexibility analy-
sis” (IRFA).  The IRFA, or a summary thereof, must be published in the 
Federal Register along with the proposed rule.  The IRFA or the certifica-
tion must be sent to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy.  Courts now regularly 
review such certifications.58 
                                                                                                                           
 54 44 U.S.C. § 3507 (f) (2006).  
 55 5 U.S.C. § 601(3)-(5) (2006) (providing definitions of these terms, although they are open-
ended in the sense that agencies can establish alternative definitions appropriate to their activities); see 
also Dep’t. of Commerce,  GUIDELINES FOR PROPER CONSIDERATION OF SMALL ENTITIES IN AGENCY 
RULEMAKING, available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/zregs/guidelines.htm (“A small business 
is any business that meets the size standards set forth in part 121 of Title 13, Code of Federal Regula-
tions (CFR). Part 121 sets forth, by the North American Industry Classification System (NACIS), the 
maximum number of employees or maximum average annual receipts a business may have to be con-
sidered a small entity. Provision is made for an agency to develop industry-specific  definitions.  The  
NACIS  is  available  at  http://www.sba.gov/size/sizetable2002.html.  A small organization is any not-
for-profit enterprise that is independently owned and operated and not dominant in its field.  A small 
government jurisdiction is any government or district with a population of less than 50,000.”). 
 56 5 U.S.C. § 603(a)(3)-(b)(3); see also 5 U.S.C. § 611(b) (noting that the agency’s explanation 
will be part of the “whole record of action” if judicial review of a final rule is sought). 
 57 5 U.S.C. § 605(b) (2006).  
 58 For a case upholding the Agency’s certification, see  Cement Kiln Recycling Co. v. EPA, 255 
F.3d 855, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that under the RFA, an agency need not consider impacts on 
small business indirectly affected by the regulation of other entities, and upholding  EPA certification by 
concluding that only six directly affected facilities met the definition of a “small business” and that only 
two of these would experience compliance costs in excess of one percent of annual sales); but see N.C. 
Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Daley, 27 F. Supp. 2d 650, 659-60 (E.D. Va. 1998) (setting aside the annual 
fishing quota rule where the Secretary “did not consider a community any smaller than the entire state of 
North Carolina . . . ignored readily available data which would have shown the number of fishing ves-
sels impacted by the agency’s regulations, . . . disregarded the simple distinction between a license 
holder and a fisherman who actually fishes for flounder . . . [and] improperly maintained that any pre-
sent economic loss are alleviated by past revenues earned by overfishing”); S. Offshore Fishing Ass’n v. 
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When a rule will have a significant economic impact, the agency, in 
addition to publishing the proposed rule and IRFA, or summary, in the   
Federal Register, “shall assure that small entities have been given an oppor-
tunity to participate in the rulemaking for the rule through the reasonable 
use of techniques” such as advance notice of proposed rulemaking, publica-
tion of notice in specialized publications, direct notification of small       
entities, the holding of public conferences or hearings, or use of simplified 
or modified procedures that make it easier for small entities to participate.59  
After the comment period on the proposed rule is closed, the agency must 
either certify a lack of impact or prepare a “final regulatory flexibility anal-
ysis” (FRFA), which, among other things, responds to issues raised by pub-
lic comments on the IRFA.60  The agency is not required to send the FRFA 
to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, but it must make it available to the pub-
lic on request and publish the analysis or a summary of it in the Federal 
Register.61 
It is unclear how big of a burden this would be for the Board.  It is    
interesting to note that in the health care bargaining unit rule itself, the 
Board issued a second notice of proposed rulemaking, in part to add a Reg-
ulatory Flexibility Act certification.62  It is certainly possible that a Board 
rule might have a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities,” and if so the agency would need to do the requisite analysis.  
This determination is subject to judicial review.63  However, the courts have 
held that only “small entities directly regulated by the proposed [regulation] 
– whose conduct is circumscribed or mandated – may bring a challenge to 
the RFA analysis or certification of an agency. . . . However, when the regu-
lation reaches small entities only indirectly, they do not have standing to 
bring an RFA challenge.”64  This may mitigate the risk of a lawsuit against 
the Board under the RFA. 
                                                                                                                           
Daley, 995 F. Supp. 1411, 1434-37 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (rejecting the Commerce Department’s certification 
of no significant impact on shark fishermen of a fifty-percent quota cut, and granting summary judgment 
under RFA); S. Offshore Fishing Ass’n v. Daley, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (granting an 
injunction against the following year’s quota after remand).   
 59 5 U.S.C. § 609 (2006).  
 60 5 U.S.C. § 604(a); see also Grand Canyon Air Tour Co. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 470-71 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (accepting FAA’s responses to comments on IRFA). 
 61 5 U.S.C. § 604(b).  
 62 See Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,934 
(Sept. 1, 1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103); Grunewald, supra note 6, at 304 (suggesting that 
the “desire to correct [the omission of the certification] might, in part have motivated an additional 
comment period”).  See also the recent “clarification” by the National Mediation Board to a proposed 
rule adding such a formal certification, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,695 (Dec. 4, 2009).  
 63 5 U.S.C. § 611 (2006).  
 64 White Eagle Co-op. Ass’n v. Conner, 553 F.3d 467, 480 (7th Cir. 2009).  
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A quirk in the NLRA might also have an effect on the Board’s perfor-
mance of its duties under the RFA.  Section 4 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 
154, appears to bar the Board from hiring economists.”65  This provision 
was added in the Taft Hartley Act,66 but the legislative history is sparse.67  In 
the Senate’s debate over whether to override President Roosevelt’s veto, 
Senator Kilgore (D-WV) criticized the provision:   
[S]uch experts are necessary to study industrial relations, to study 
company statistical records, to help compute back-pay obligations of 
companies, to provide the necessary advice for the Board to determine 
what is and what is not fail in the way of wages. But they are forbid-
den to hire such men.  Whom are they going to get? Will the Board 
proceed along the line of intelligent guesses we hear so much about? 
How a Government agency concerned week in and week out with 
problems arising out of economic conditions can function without the 
help of economists is a question I cannot answer.  I would as soon op-
erate a mine without a mining-engineer as to try to establish a wage 
scale without an economic staff who can study the economics of the 
situation.68 
Senator Ferguson (R-MI), in responding to Senator Kilgore, seemed to 
be concerned that without the provision, “this administrative board [could] 
go outside the record, build up its own record unbeknown to the union or 
the company, and make a decision based on what it may find from the   
opinion of its own economists outside the record.”69 
But regardless of the motives of the drafters, this provision hardly 
squares with recent congressional moves to increase the use of cost-benefit 
analysis in regulation, and I suspect that the Board would have very little 
difficulty in obtaining congressional acquiescence in removing this provi-
sion.  If it is not removed, however, it would be hard to fault the Board for 
not performing adequate economic analysis under the RFA or any other 
statutory or executive mandate.   
                                                                                                                           
 65 “Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals for 
the purpose of conciliation or mediation, or for economic analysis.”  29 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).  
 66 Taft Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).  
 67 The Senate Report on the Taft-Hartley Act indicates that the words “or for economic analysis” 
were substituted in section 4(a) for “(or for statistical work, where such service may be obtained from 
the Department of Labor)”.  The conference report on section 4, which added this language, did not even 
refer to it.  See H.R. REP. NO. 510, at 37-38 (1947) (Conf. Rep.).  
 68 93 CONG. REC. 7418 (1947).  
 69 93 CONG. REC. 7419 (1947). 
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3.  Congressional Review Act 
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 
added a new chapter to Title 5 of the United States Code, establishing a 
requirement for congressional review of agency rules.70  This title became 
commonly known as the Congressional Review Act (CRA).  Under this 
process, all federal agencies, including independent regulatory agencies, are 
required to submit each “rule” to both houses of Congress and to the     
Government Accountability Office (GAO) before it can take effect. 
The definition of “rule” in the CRA is similar to the basic APA defini-
tion in 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) but with fewer exceptions.71  For each such rule, 
agencies must submit to Congress:  (1) a report containing “a concise     
general statement relating to the rule” and the rule’s proposed effective 
date; and (2) a copy of any special analysis or statement required by statute 
or relevant executive orders.72  “Major” rules (i.e., rules with an impact      
exceeding $100 million on the economy) are subject to a sixty-day delay in 
their effective date73 while they are reviewed by Congress.74  Non-major 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Small Business Regulatory Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, subtitle E, 110 
Stat. 856 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2006)).  See Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congression-
al Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95 (1997); see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, DISAPPROVAL OF REGULATIONS BY CONGRESS: PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL 
REVIEW ACT (Oct. 10, 2001) (Richard S. Beth, primary author), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL31160.pdf.  
 71 5 U.S.C. § 804 (2006). The following types of rules are exempted from congressional review: 
(1) rules of particular applicability; (2) rules relating to agency management or personnel; and (3) rules 
of agency organization, procedure, or practice that do not substantially affect the rights or obligations of 
nonagency parties.  Id. § 804(3).  Certain rules of the Federal Reserve Board are also exempted.  Id. § 
807.  
 72 5 U.S.C. § 801(a). 
 73 A major rule takes effect, unless disapproved, on the latest of three possible dates: (1) sixty 
calendar days after Congress receives the report or the rule is published in the Federal Register; (2) 
where Congress has passed a joint resolution of disapproval of the rule, subsequently vetoed by the 
President, 30 session days after Congress receives the veto, or if earlier, the date on which either House 
of Congress votes and fails to override the veto; or (3) the date on which the rule would otherwise go 
into effect, if not for this review requirement.  Id. § 801(a)(3).  If either House votes to reject a joint 
resolution of disapproval, the rule goes into effect at that time.  Id. § 801(a)(5).  
Note that supporters of a popular rule can engineer such a vote early in the 60-day period to hasten 
the rule’s effective date.  See, e.g., S.J. Res. 60, 104th Cong. (1996) (disapproving Medicare rule) (re-
jected).  
 74 More specifically, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that the CRA does not 
alter major rules’ effective dates, but simply suspends their operation pending the outcome of Congres-
sional review.  There are also exceptions to the delayed effective date provision.  Major rules relating to 
hunting, fishing, and camping can be made effective immediately.  5 U.S.C. § 808(1).  There is also a 
“good cause” exception in § 808(2), similar to that in 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).  Finally, the President may 
personally make a rule immediately effective by issuing an Executive Order that the rule is necessary 
due to an imminent threat to health, safety, or other emergency; necessary for the enforcement of crimi-
nal laws; necessary for national security; or issued pursuant to any statute implementing an international 
trade agreement.  5 U.S.C. § 801(c)(2).  
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rules can go into effect without delay, although Congress may, of course, 
still review them.   
The CRA’s main purpose is to provide Congress with an expedited 
method of disapproving agency rules.  To be constitutional, however, it 
requires passage by both houses of a joint resolution of disapproval and 
presentation to the President for signature.75   
While a large number of rules are sent to Congress each week,76 the 
impact of the CRA on the rulemaking process has been slight.  Obviously, it 
gives interested parties another “bite at the apple” after the agency’s process 
is complete.  It also gives Congress another weapon in its oversight arsenal.  
But so far, only one rule has been disapproved and few resolutions of dis-
approval have even been introduced.77  The disapproval occurred in March 
2001 when the Congressional leadership, supported by the Bush Admin-
istration, successfully used the Congressional Review Act to overturn the 
Clinton Administration’s OSHA’s controversial ergonomic regulations.78  
Even though a similar scenario unfolded in 2009, the Congress and 
Obama Administration did not make use of the CRA to overturn Bush    
Administration rules.  Thus the law appears to be more of an annoyance for 
the agencies than a useful tool for Congress.  Nevertheless, it has created 
new responsibilities for agencies and Congress, new waiting periods, and 
new pressure points in the process.  Moreover, it has created new tracking 
responsibilities for the agencies.79 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983) (setting forth the Constitution’s Bicameral 
and Presentment Clauses, art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3).  
 76 As of March 31, 2008, the Comptroller General had submitted reports on 731 major rules under 
§ 801(a)(2)(A) and GAO had cataloged the submission of 47,540 non-major rules as required by § 
801(a)(1)(A). CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY 
RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT AFTER A DECADE, at 6 (May 8, 2008) (Morton Rosenberg, 
primary author), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30116.pdf.  
 77 Rosenberg reports that forty-seven resolutions have been introduced through March 2008; only 
five received any sort of a floor vote.  Id. at 7-14, tbl. 1.  
 78 The ergonomics regulations issued after ten years of development by OSHA addressed the 
concerns that surround repetitive lifting and motions in the workplace. These regulations would have 
mandated standards for employers to promote ergonomics, buy specific equipment and reduce work-
place injuries.  See Ergonomics Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,403 (Apr. 23, 2001) (providing official notice 
of withdrawal of the regulation).  
 79 See Oversight Hearings on the Congressional Review Act Before the House Subcomm. on 
Commercial and Administrative Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 68-70 (1997) (state-
ment of Jon Cannon, General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency) (describing the centralization 
of the submittal and tracking function at EPA and the need for a daily messenger to deliver rules to three 
required offices); id. at 70-74 (statement of Nancy McFadden, General Counsel, Department of Trans-
portation) (describing the computer tracking system and messenger system used by the Department). 
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4.  Executive Orders 
There are numerous Executive Orders and other presidential or OMB 
documents that contain procedural or analytical requirements applicable to 
rulemaking by executive branch agencies.80   
The key to such directive is Executive Order 12,866,81 which mandates 
that executive agencies submit all of their “significant” proposed and final 
rules to the Office of Information and Regulatory (OIRA) for review and 
clearance.  Another key feature is that “economically significant” rules with 
an impact of over $100 million on the economy must be accompanied by a 
cost-benefit analysis.  This Order was issued by President Clinton in 1993, 
survived the Bush Administration, and is still in effect at this writing, pend-
ing a well-publicized review by the Obama Administration.82   
The good news for the NLRB is that few of these executive orders and 
White House directives have been made applicable to the independent regu-
latory agencies.83  Although some scholars (including one who is now the 
present occupant of the key position of Administrator of OIRA), have advo-
cated extending the White House rulemaking review executive order to 
independent agencies,84 no President has attempted to do so – with the one 
limited attempt by President Clinton that is explained below.  One reason 
may be that members of independent agencies do not serve at the pleasure 
of the President so White House leverage over an independent agency that 
failed to follow an executive order is more limited.  Therefore, NLRB rules 
are not subject to OMB review – a process that typically adds about six 
months to the rulemaking process because, under the executive order, OIRA 
has 90 days to review the submission at both the proposed and final stages.   
The two aspects of Executive Order 12,866 that President Clinton did 
direct to all agencies (including the independent agencies) were to: (1) par-
ticipate in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory   
                                                                                                                           
 80 See Lubbers, supra note 38, at 147-95; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, RULEMAKING 
REQUIREMENTS     (2009)     (prepared    by     Neil     Eisner),     available     at     http://regs.dot.gov/ 
rulemakingrequirements.htm.  
 81 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).   
 82 Obama request for comments.  Obama did revoke two relatively minor Bush amendments to 
E.O. 12,866.  Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Feb. 4, 2009).  
 83 The only statutory definition of “independent regulatory agencies” is found in the Paperwork 
Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §3501); see also Mar-
shall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent 
Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111 (2000). 
 84 See Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal 
Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 203 (1986).  Professor Sunstein is now the OIRA Administrator.   
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Actions85 by publishing information on all regulations under development 
or review; and (2) develop an annual “Regulatory Plan” to be forwarded to 
OIRA by June of each year for review by the OMB Director and other   
“Advisors.”86  The order also requires that the plan include the agency’s 
plans to review existing regulations.87 
Many independent agencies do comply with this presidential di-
rective/request, and the NLRB would have to decide whether to do so –
though it is not a particularly burdensome task. 
B.  Judicial Review Concerns 
Unlike the NLRA, statutes containing judicial review provisions appli-
cable to rulemaking generally call for direct, pre-enforcement review in the 
courts of appeals.  Most of the major rulemaking programs are covered by 
such a provision, and statutes establishing the programs normally contain 
requirements as to venue, timing of review, and scope of review. 
The Administrative Conference recommended placing direct review of 
rules in the courts of appeals in instances where: (1) the rule is so signifi-
cant that a district court decision would likely be appealed; and (2) where 
other “orders” of agencies are already reviewed that way.  The complete 
Conference statement on the subject is as follows: 
The appropriate forum for the review of rules promulgated pursuant to 
the notice-and-comment procedures of 5 U.S.C. 553 should be deter-
mined in the light of the following considerations: 
(a) Absence of a formal administrative record based on a trial-type 
hearing does not preclude direct review of rules by courts of appeals 
because: (i) Compliance with procedural requirements of 5 U.S.C. 
553, including the requirement of a statement of reasons for the rule, 
will ordinarily produce a record adequate to the purpose of judicial   
review, and (ii) the administrative record can usually be supplement-
ed, if necessary, by means other than an evidentiary trial in a district 
court. 
(b) Direct review by a court of appeals is appropriate whenever: (i) An 
initial district court decision respecting the validity of a rule will ordi-
                                                                                                                           
 85 The title was changed to add “Deregulatory” in 1996. For online versions of the Agenda from 
1995 to the present, see Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ 
(then follow “Unified Agenda” hyperlink(s)) (last visited July 19, 2010).  
 86 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). The “Advisors” are top 
regulatory policy officials of the Administration.  Id. § 3(a). The plan is published each year in the 
October Unified Agenda.   
 87 Id. § 5.  
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narily be appealed or (ii) the public interest requires prompt, authorita-
tive determination of the validity of the rule. 
(c) Rules issued by agencies that regularly engage in formal adjudica-
tion and whose “orders” are subject by statute to direct review by the 
courts of appeals will normally satisfy the criteria of (b) above and in 
any event should be reviewable directly by the court of appeals. 
(d) Rules of other agencies that do not satisfy the criteria of (b) above 
should generally be reviewable in the first instance by the district 
courts.88 
NLRB rulemaking surely meets the criteria set forth above for judicial 
review in the courts of appeals.  Amending the NLRA in this regard is im-
portant in order to avoid district court forum shopping and two-level review 
in challenges to virtually all significant Board rules.  Moreover, since Board 
adjudicative orders are already reviewable directly in the courts of appeals, 
those courts are familiar with the Board’s authority.  Professor Grunewald 
recognized how important this point is for the future of NLRB rulemaking: 
The most formal of these steps [to enhance the prospects for further 
rulemaking] would be to amend the NLRA to provide specifically for 
preenforcement judicial review of a final Board rule.  This would con-
fine review to a single proceeding, thus avoiding the confusion and   
inefficiency of serial challenges to a rule.  The simplest and most    
traditional provision along this line would authorize an exclusive pro-
ceeding in any one of the courts of appeals.  Consistent with well-
recognized needs for prompt and comprehensive review when rules 
having broad national impact are challenged, the provision should also 
impose a time limit on seeking preenforcement review, and should 
preclude review in enforcement proceedings of questions of (1) 
whether the rule was within the authority of the Board, (2) whether 
procedural requirements for the rulemaking were satisfied, and (3) 
whether there was adequate support for the rule in the rulemaking   
record.89 
The Administrative Conference agreed and so recommended: 
Congress should amend the National Labor Relations Act to confine 
preenforcement review of final Board rules to a single proceeding.  
Review should be authorized in the appropriate court of appeals.  This 
                                                                                                                           
 88 ACUS Recommendation:  The Choice of Forum for Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
(Recommendation 75-3), 40 Fed. Reg. 27,926 (July 2, 1975). 
 89 Grunewald, supra note 6, at 321. 
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authorization should include a reasonable time limit on the seeking of 
preenforcement review and preclude judicial review of rules at the   
enforcement state concerning issues relating to whether (a) the proce-
dures employed in the rulemaking were adequate, or (b) there was   
adequate support for the rule in the administrative record.90 
C.   Need for the Board to Equip Itself to Undertake More Rulemakings 
If the Board does decide to undertake more rulemaking, it needs to 
have the wherewithal to do so.  As Grunewald, suggested: 
[F]urther use of rulemaking would be a more realistic prospect for the 
Board, as an institutional matter, if there were a staff that could be 
called upon to provide support regardless of the particular subject of 
the rulemaking.  Such a staff not only might provide support in       
ongoing proceedings, but also might be a source of substantive and 
procedural expertise in considering future rulemakings.91 
The Board would also have to jump aboard the current transition into 
the world of “e-rulemaking,” by participating in the new government-wide 
rulemaking portal, Regulations.gov,
 92 and in the unified docketing system, 
the Federal Docket Management System.93 
Grunewald also recognized the need for a “regularized method for 
identifying manageable and timely subjects for possible rulemaking.”94  
This idea was fleshed out by the Administrative Conference as follows:   
(b) Identification of Subjects for Rulemaking 
To assist the Board in identifying manageable and timely subjects for 
which rulemaking might be appropriate, it should consider, among 
others, the following factors: 
(i) The need for submissions and information, including empirical    
data, beyond that normally available through adjudication. 
(ii) The value of participation by affected persons beyond the parties 
likely to participate in adjudication, with particular attention to possi-
ble reliance on prior policy and the breadth of impact of a new policy. 
                                                                                                                           
 90 ACUS Recommendation:  Facilitating the Use of Rulemaking by the National Labor Relations 
Board (Recommendation 91-5), 56 Fed. Reg. 33,852 ¶ 3 (July 24, 1991). 
 91 Grunewald, supra note 6, at 322. 
 92 Regulations.gov, http://www.regulations.gov (last visited July 19, 2010). 
 93 Federal     Docket     Management     System,    https://fdms.erulemaking.net/fdms-web-agency/ 
component/submitterInfoCoverPage?Call. 
 94 Grunewald, supra note 6, at 322. 
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(iii) The need to establish policy promptly in new areas of responsibil-
ity or for new enforcement initiatives. 
(iv) The opportunity for stabilizing policy in the particular subject    
area. 
(v) The likelihood that future litigation and enforcement costs may be 
lessened if a readily applicable rule is developed. 
(vi) The need to achieve control over the subject and timing of policy 
review and development.95 
D.  Integrating Rulemaking with Pending Adjudications 
Because a Board rulemaking is likely to relate to issues involved in 
pending cases, it will need to consider how to handle this potential problem.  
The ACUS recommendation suggests: 
The Board should develop a policy to govern situations in which the 
subject of a proposed rule has already been the focus of consideration 
in prior adjudicatory proceedings.  The Board should seek to antici-
pate enforcement issues that may arise during the pendency of the 
rulemaking and possible judicial review.  During the pendency of a 
rulemaking, the Board and its independent General Counsel ordinarily 
should continue to act under its body of precedent, but they should be 
prepared to depart from precedent in individual cases where the appli-
cation of such precedent would be unfair or inefficient.96 
Grunewald puts a finer point on this issue by raising the issue of what 
the Board should do, if, as happened in the health care bargaining unit rule, 
a court enjoins the rule pending judicial review.  This issue would hopefully 
not arise if the NLRA were amended to place judicial review directly in the 
courts of appeals.  And it may be that the Board will continue to eschew 
rulemaking absent such an amendment.  But if not, Grunewald suggests 
that:   
Given its broad enforcement responsibilities, the Board should ordi-
narily continue to apply existing law during the pendency of a rule-
making as it did with health care unit determinations. Yet once a rule 
is promulgated, even though it may become the subject of judicial   
review, the Board should ordinarily apply the law expressed in the rule 
                                                                                                                           
 95 ACUS Recommendation, supra note 90.   
 96 Id. ¶ 2(c).  
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as promulgated-unless a court order issued in the course of the review 
proceeding would preclude that action.97 
  V.  THE EXAMPLE OF THE RECENT NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 
RULEMAKING 
In what might be regarded as a “dress rehearsal” for future NLRB 
rulemaking, the Board’s sister agency, the National Mediation Board 
(NMB), has just completed its first significant rulemaking in many years.  
The NMB, which resolves representation disputes concerning employees 
covered by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), (concerning primarily rail and 
airline employees), proposed a change in its longstanding way of ascertain-
ing how to determine support for a collective bargaining representative after 
an election.98  Prior to this rulemaking, the NMB’s “policy require[d] that a       
majority of eligible voters in the craft or class must cast valid ballots in 
favor of representation.”99  On November 3, 2009, the NMB proposed 
changing that policy to “allow the Board to certify as collective bargaining 
representative any organization which receives a majority of votes cast in 
an election.”100  In part the NMB relied on the fact that the relevant provi-
sions of the RLA and NLRA are similar and that the NLRB certifies collec-
tive bargaining representatives “on the basis of the majority of ballots 
cast.”101 
This rulemaking proved to be controversial.  Both the proposed rule 
and the final rule were issued over the published dissent of the NMB 
Chairman.102  The NMB (like the NLRB in the health care bargaining unit 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Grunewald, supra note 6, at 323. 
 98 Proposed Rules National Mediation Board: Representation Election Procedure, 74 Fed. Reg. 
56,750 (Nov. 3, 2009) (to be codified at 29 CFR pts. 1202, 1206).  The final rule was published     
(adopting the proposed rule) on May 11, 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 26,062.  The rule was subsequently upheld 
by the federal district court in Air Transport Ass’n. of America, Inc. v. National Mediation Bd., 719 F. 
Supp. 2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  The author served as a consultant to provide training to the NMB mem-
bers on rulemaking generally and to provide advice to the NMB General Counsel on this rulemaking, 
but all information provided here is from the public record.   
 99 Id. at 56,751.   
 100 Id.  
 101 Id. 
 102 See dissent of NMB Chairman Elizabeth Dougherty, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,752-54 (proposed rule), 
and 75 Fed. Reg. 26,083-88 (final rule).  I would point out that the APA does not address the possibility 
of dissents in agency rulemakings, and agencies seem to have widely different practices in this regard.  
See, e.g., proposed rules by:  Railroad Retirement Board, 60 Fed. Reg. 67,108, 67,109 (Dec. 28, 1995) 
(paraphrasing the dissenting views of the Labor Member of the Board); Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,700 (Aug. 8, 1984) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 55) (including separate Views 
of Commissioner); Federal Communications Commission, 75 F.C.C.2d 138, (1979) (including various 
Commissioners’ concurring and dissenting statements).  See also final rules by:  Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,904 (July 20, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (including 
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rule) decided it would be prudent to hold a public hearing on this           
proposal.103  It heard thirty-one witnesses104 and also received nearly 24,962 
comments during its sixty-day comment period.105   
The NMB issued its final rule, adopting the proposed rule without 
change, on May 11, 2010 – just over five months after publishing its       
proposal.106   This was a rather remarkably expeditious rulemaking, consi-
dering that the Board and its small staff had little experience with rule-
making, held a public hearing, received almost 25,000 comments, ruled on 
motions to disqualify the two members voting for the rule,107 and published 
a twenty-page preamble in the Federal Register primarily responding to 
comments.   
Despite the claims of lack of statutory support, inadequate factual sup-
port, procedural failings, and bias raised in comments by opponents of the 
rule and in the dissenting statement, a subsequent court challenge to the 
NMB rule failed in federal district court.108  Of course there is still a possi-
bility of an appeal to the D.C. Circuit, so the litigation may not be over, but 
                                                                                                                           
Commissioner’s partial dissent as attachment); Consumer Product Safety Commission, 71 Fed. Reg. 
42,028 (July 25, 2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1115) (explaining that the Commission voted 2-1 
to issue the rule, with the dissenting Commissioner’s statement and separate statements from the two 
Commissioners in the majority available from the Office of the Secretary or on the Commission’s web-
site); Railroad Retirement Board, 67 Fed. Reg. 5723 (Feb. 7, 2002) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 200) 
(adopting a final rule “by the majority of the Board, Management Member dissenting”); Federal Com-
munications Commission, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,188 (Mar. 20, 1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) 
(correcting final rule and including a Commissioner’s dissenting statement, inadvertently omitted in the 
original).  
The NMB’s proposed rule included disclaimers that the rule would not have any triggering impacts 
under the Paperwork Reduction Act, Regulatory Flexibility Act or National Environmental Policy Act.  
The agency later published a clarification containing a similar formal certification under the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act.  Proposed Rules National Mediation Board: Representation Election Procedure, 74 Fed. 
Reg. at 56,754.  
 103 Proposed Rules National Mediation Board: Representation Election Procedure, 74 Fed. Reg. 
57,427 (Nov. 6, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1202, 1206).  The one-day hearing was held on 
December 7, 2009 at a hearing room in the National Labor Relations Board, which also provided the 
security for the meeting.  
 104 See Rules and Regulations National Mediation Board: Representation Election Procedure, 75 
Fed. Reg. 26,062, 26,063 (May 11, 2010) (to be codified at 29 CFR pts. 1202, 1206).  The list of wit-
nesses is available on the NMB’s  website.  NMB Open  Meeting  Speakers  List,  http://www.nmb.gov 
/representation/proposed-rulemaking/speakers-list_12-07-09.html (last visited July 19, 2010). 
 105 See Rules and Regulations National Mediation Board: Representation Election Procedure, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 26,063.  Over 22,000 were form letters.  See Proposed NMB Representation Rulemaking, 
http://www.nmb.gov/representation/ 
proposed-rep-rulemaking.html (last visited July 19, 2010).  
 106 Rules and Regulations National Mediation Board: Representation Election Procedure, 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 26,062. 
 107 The denial of the motions was included in the preamble. Id. at 26,063-66. 
 108 Air Transport Ass’n. of America, Inc. v. National Mediation Bd., 719 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 
2010).   
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the NMB has at least shown that labor-related rulemaking can be undertak-
en efficiently and expeditiously.  
 
VI.  POSSIBLE EXAMPLES OF FUTURE BOARD RULEMAKINGS 
It is undoubtedly presumptuous for me to suggest specific rulemaking 
projects for the NLRB; even raising them brings to mind the proverbial 
“briar patch.”  However, I do have some very tentative ideas on the subject.  
For starters, it might be best to consider such initiatives in areas where the 
subject area of the potential rulemaking has been a subject of frequent   
recent litigation and requires some rationalization.   
One such example is in the compliance area.  After the Board has     
determined that an employer or union has committed an unfair labor prac-
tice, the next stage in the proceeding is compliance.  Compliance involves 
the Board securing the steps required to remedy the unfair labor practices 
determined to have been committed.  A common aspect of compliance is 
the duty of employers guilty of a discriminatory discharge to compensate 
employees with backpay subject to the concurrent duty of employees to 
mitigate wage loss by reasonably looking for interim work.  An aspect of 
this that has seen a spate of litigation concerns who has the burden of proof 
as to whether there has been a reasonable search for interim employment,109 
and, relatedly, how soon the employee has to begin looking for it,110 and 
whether strike benefits can be treated as interim earnings.111  These issues 
would seem to lend themselves to the sort of collection of views and data 
that would be facilitated by a rulemaking proceeding.   
A similar area of uncertainty is the complicated question of whether 
“employee involvement committees” are “labor organizations” under    
section 2(5) of the NLRA,112 including the issues raised by the somewhat 
conflicting decisions of Electromation, Inc.113 and Crown Cork & Seal.114 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See St. George Warehouse, 351 N.L.R.B. 961 (2007) (Board reverses prior law by placing 
burden on the employee to show reasonable search, though employer keeps burden of showing there 
were substantially equivalent job in the geographic area). 
 110 See Grosvenor Resort, 350 N.L.R.B. 1197 (2007) (delay of four to eight weeks too long; back-
pay denied).  
 111 See Domsey Trading Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 824 (2007) (petition for enforcement denied in 
N.L.R.B. v. Domsey Trading Corp., 383 Fed.Appx. 46, 188 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3023 (2nd Cir. Jun 30, 
2010)).  
 112 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2),  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006) (stating that such labor 
organization may not be “dominated” by employers under the NLRA).  
 113 Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992) enforced, Electromation, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 35 
F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that employer “action committees” made up of management and 
employee representative s on various workplace issues were labor organizations, partly because they 
“dealt with” management; the court also held that the action committees were “dominated” by manage-
ment). 
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A second consideration pointing to the use of rulemaking is the        
existence of outmoded standards developed in past adjudications, resulting, 
for example, from economic inflation or changes in technology. 
Several examples of inflation-eroded standards are presented by the 
Board’s discretionary monetary jurisdictional standards.  For example, the 
jurisdictional standard for nonretail enterprises, set in a 1959 Board deci-
sion,115 is $50,000 in annual direct or indirect outflow or inflow.  In 2009 
dollars that amount would be nearly $364,000.116  The jurisdictional     
standard for retail concerns, based on a 1975 decision,117 is $500,000 in 
annual gross volume of business – nearly $2,000,000 in 2009 dollars.  I am 
not suggesting that these higher amounts are the right levels for Board    
jurisdiction – merely that a rulemaking might be a way to revisit and update 
the various aspects of the Board jurisdictional lines, most of which were 
decided long ago via case-by-case adjudication.118 
New technology has provided opportunities for Board rulemaking in 
the election procedure area.  In the 1966 Excelsior Underwear case119 the 
Board established a requirement that in all election cases, the employer 
must turn over to the Board the names and addresses of all the eligible    
voters within seven days after the election has been agreed to or directed.  
The Board then turns this information to all parties in the case.120  Another 
Board requirement is that the election cannot take place for ten days to give 
the union a chance to use this information.121  The advent of electronic tech-
nology would allow some significant adjustment in these deadlines.  First, it 
should be easier for the employer to compile, maintain and submit this   
information.  Seven days may have been necessary in the age of paper   
                                                                                                                           
 114 Crown Cork & Seal Co. Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 699 (2001) (holding that employee committees 
given delegated authority to operate the plant, subject to managerial oversight were not labor organiza-
tions because they did not “deal with management”). 
 115 48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Labor Relations § 624 (2010) (citing Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 
N.L.R.B. 81 (1958) decision supplemented on other grounds, 124 N.L.R.B 594 (1959)). 
 116 See The Inflation Calculator, http://westegg.com/inflation (last visited July 19, 2010).  
 117 48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Labor Relations § 625 (2010) (citing Dilene Answering Serv. Inc., 
216 N.L.R.B. 669 (1975). 
 118 See Colleges and Universities, 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (2009) (According to the final rule preamble, 
the proposed rule received thirty-three comments); Symphony Orchestras, 29 C.F.R. § 103.2 (2009) 
(According to the final rule preamble, the proposed rule received twenty-six comments); Horseracing 
and Dogracing Industries, 29 C.F.R. § 103.3 (2009) (announcing that the Board would not assert juris-
diction in any proceeding under sections 8-10 of the NLRA involving these industries). 
 119 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). 
 120 Id. at 1239-40. 
 121 See NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL FOR REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS § 11302.1, availa-
ble at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/CHMII/Sections11300-11350.pdf; see also § 11312.1 
(providing that, with some exceptions, an election may not be held sooner than 10 days after the list of 
names and addresses of the eligible voters is due to be received by the Regional Director).   
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records and postal delivery, but two or three days should suffice now.     
Secondly, the disclosure requirement might be updated to include          
employees’ email addresses and/or cell phone numbers.  Moreover, the 
Board should now be able to transmit the information electronically to the 
union; that in itself might allow a shorter period before the election.        
Finally, since the waiting period is supposed to protect the union, perhaps 
the union should be allowed to waive it.  All of these steps to shorten the 
election period could well be considered in a rulemaking. 
Similarly, the exclusive union hiring hall, used frequently in the con-
struction industry and at ports around the country, is a possible topic for 
rulemaking.122  There are many rules governing illegal discrimination 
against non-union members or among union members in such halls which 
can amount to a breach of the duty of fair representation.123  Moreover, it 
can be a violation of the NLRA if a hall is operated in an arbitrary and    
capricious way.124  One example might be that the rules of the hiring hall 
may not be noticed or posted properly.  A rulemaking proceeding could help 
rationalize the adjudicative decisions in this area and even perhaps take 
advantage of new technology in modernizing hiring hall requirements. 
These examples are intended to be illustrative.  To the extent they 
seem unrealistic to labor law practitioners, I apologize, and invite them to 
suggest their own nominations.  But I cannot believe that in the large body 
of NLRB case law there are not numerous opportunities for policymaking 
by rulemaking. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION  
The NLRB should reconsider its long-standing antipathy toward rule-
making.  Its legal authority to make rules has been ratified by a unanimous 
Supreme Court decision.  As an independent agency it has more freedom 
and should be able to move more expeditiously than other executive     
agencies.  Its rules are not subject to OMB review (other than under the 
Paperwork Reduction Act) and several other statutory and presidential di-
rectives are not applicable to it.   
                                                                                                                           
 122 See generally Stagehands Referral Serv., LLC, 347 N.L.R.B. 1167, 1170-71 (2006) (providing 
information on the operation of a hiring hall).   
 123 See, e.g., Plumbers and Pipe Fitters Local Union No. 32 v. N.L.R.B., 50 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 
1995).  
 124 A union commits an unfair labor practice if it administers an exclusive hiring hall arbitrarily or 
without reference to objective criteria, even absent a showing of animus against nonmembers. Boiler-
makers Local 374 v. N.L.R.B., 852 F.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 
319 N.L.R.B. 609 (1995); but see Jacoby v N.L.R.B., 325 F.3d 301 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Contra Coastal 
Elec., Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 688 (1999) (holding mere negligence in the operation of an exclusive hiring 
hall does not constitute a violation of the Act). 
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However, its organic statute, the NLRA, needs several fixes for the 
Board to proceed confidently with rulemaking.  A judicial review provision 
for direct judicial review of rules in the courts of appeals needs to be added, 
along with a time limit for bringing certain types of challenges.              
Additionally, the NLRA’s apparent prohibition on the Board’s employment 
of economists is anomalous and should be removed. 
Once these actions are taken (which should not be controversial in and 
of themselves), the Board should, through training and strategic hiring,    
assemble a rulemaking staff, develop a rulemaking agenda (consistent, of 
course, with its continuing adjudicative responsibilities) and go forward 
into the world of notice-and-comment rulemaking.  If China can do it, so 
can the NLRB! 
 
[Epilogue:  As this article was being prepared for publication, the 
NLRB released for public comment a set of proposed rules governing noti-
fication on employee rights under the NLRA.  See 75 Fed. Reg. 80,410, 
(Dec. 22, 2010).] 
 
